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1 
The Post-Chicago Antitrust Revolution: A Retrospective 
Christopher S. Yoo† 
A symposium examining the contributions of the post-Chicago School 
provides an appropriate opportunity to offer some thoughts on both the past and 
the future of antitrust. This afterword reviews the excellent papers with an eye 
toward appreciating the contributions and limitations of both the Chicago School, 
in terms of promoting the consumer welfare standard and embracing price theory 
as the preferred mode of economic analysis, and the post-Chicago School, with its 
emphasis on game theory and firm-level strategic conduct. It then explores two 
emerging trends, specifically neo-Brandeisian advocacy for abandoning consumer 
welfare as the sole goal of antitrust and the increasing emphasis on empirical 
analyses. 
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INTRODUCTION 
I would like to thank the Law Review staff for inviting me to write the afterword to what 
was a terrific symposium. Milestone conferences like this provide a welcome opportunity to look 
 
† John H. Chestnut Professor of Law, Communication, and Computer & Information Science and Founding 
Director, Center for Technology, Innovation and Competition, University of Pennsylvania. 
both backward to see how far the law has come and forward to project how emerging trends 
might affect future developments. 
In particular, a conference on “The Post-Chicago Antitrust Revolution” provides an 
opportunity to look not only at the post-Chicago School, but also the Chicago School, which 
motivated its genesis. In addition, this afterword is also an apt occasion to speculate about the 
potential impact of approaches that have gained increasing attention in recent years, such as neo-
Brandeisianism and empirical antitrust. 
I. THE CHICAGO REVOLUTION 
In many ways, the natural place to begin an afterword for a symposium on “The Post-
Chicago Antitrust Revolution” is by looking at the school of thought that gave this movement its 
name: the Chicago School. Post-Chicago scholars often use the Chicago School as the foil for 
their analyses.1 For example, this symposium’s opening presentation on “Framing the Chicago 
School of Antitrust Analysis” used the Chicago School’s position as the starting point for its 
critical analysis.2 Other symposium contributors took similar approaches.3 
Scholars differ in their assessment of the Chicago School’s impact. Many Chicago 
School supporters have claimed that their arguments have swept the field.4 Others assert that the 
 
1 For a prominent recent example, see HOW THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE MARK: THE EFFECT OF 
CONSERVATIVE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ON U.S. ANTITRUST (Robert Pitofsky ed., 2008), which collected essays 
largely positioned as critiques of the Chicago School. 
2 Herbert Hovenkamp & Fiona Scott Morton, Framing the Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 
1841, 1841-42 (2020). 
3 See Jonathan B. Baker & Joseph Farrell, Oligopoly Coordination, Economic Analysis, and the Prophylactic Role 
of Horizontal Merger Enforcement, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 1985, 2002-07, (2020) (contrasting the authors’ argument 
with the Chicago School’s views of oligopolies); Andrew I. Gavil & Steven C. Salop, Probability, Presumptions 
and Evidentiary Burdens in Antitrust Analysis: Revitalizing the Rule of Reason for Exclusionary Conduct, 168 U. 
PA. L. REV. 2109, 2119-24 (2020) (arguing that the Chicago School’s teachings produced presumptions and burdens 
of proof that need to be updated). 
4 For a classic example see Edmund W. Kitch, The Fire of Truth: A Remembrance of Law and Economics at 
Chicago, 1932-1970, 26 J.L. & ECON. 163 (1983). See also, e.g., Daniel A. Crane, Chicago, Post-Chicago, and Neo-
 
Harvard School has proven more influential than the Chicago School in shaping antitrust 
doctrine.5 Still others have tried to strike a middle ground, arguing that both schools played a 
critical role.6 
Differentiating between two separate threads of the Chicago School’s argument can help 
reconcile these disparate assessments. The first contends that consumer welfare/economic 
efficiency represents the sole focus of antitrust. With respect to this claim, the Chicago School 
position prevailed, with the Harvard School’s support. The second thread involves the Chicago 
School’s preferred approach to applying economic analysis principles to antitrust: price theory. 
The Chicago School’s success with respect to this latter aspect is more mixed. 
 
Chicago, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1911, 1911, 1913 (2009) (reviewing HOW THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE 
MARK, supra note 1) (discussing the Chicago School’s “complete and resounding victory” and the “tidal wave of 
pro-Chicago sentiment” that “continued to wreak its vengeance” in the 2000s); Bruce H. Kobayashi & Timothy J. 
Muris, Chicago, Post-Chicago, and Beyond: Time to Let Go of the 20th Century, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 147, 167, 171 
(2012) (concluding that “[t]here was a revolution in antitrust: Chicago prevailed” and that “[t]he Revolution 
succeeded; one only has to read the numerous Supreme Court decisions rejecting the ancien régime to understand 
the triumph of Chicago”). 
5 See Hovenkamp & Scott Morton, supra note 2, at 1869 (“The Chicago School’s influence on antitrust decision 
making in the federal courts has been more ideological than technical. In choosing technical rules, the Supreme 
Court has almost always looked to the Harvard School.”); see also, e.g., Einer Elhauge, Harvard, Not Chicago: 
Which Antitrust School Drives Recent U.S. Supreme Court Decisions?, COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L, Autumn 2007, at 
59, 60 (concluding that Supreme Court decisions “indicate an embrace of the moderate Harvard School approach . . . 
rather than an embrace of Chicago school principles”); Herbert Hovenkamp, The Harvard and Chicago Schools and 
the Dominant Firm, in HOW THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE MARK, supra note 1, at 109, 112 (“[A]ntitrust 
law as produced by the courts today comes much closer to representing the ideas of a somewhat chastised Harvard 
School than of any traditional version of the Chicago School.”). 
6 See, e.g., Thomas E. Kauper, Influence of Conservative Economic Analysis on the Development of the Law of 
Antitrust, in HOW THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE MARK, supra note 1, at 40, 42 (attributing modern doctrine 
to a collective “Chicago-Harvard Grinch and perhaps a good Grinch besides”); William E. Kovacic, The Intellectual 
DNA of Modern U.S. Competition Law for Dominant Firm Conduct: The Chicago/Harvard Double Helix, 2007 
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 13-14 (2007) (concluding that antitrust law on single-firm conduct reflects a “combination 
of Chicago School and Harvard School perspectives”); William H. Page, Areeda, Chicago, and Antitrust Injury: 
Economic Efficiency and Legal Process, 41 ANTITRUST BULL. 909, 910 (1996) (calling Harvard School leader 
Phillip Areeda and the Chicago School “the twin pillars of contemporary antitrust”). 
A. Consumer Welfare/Economic Efficiency as the Goal of Antitrust 
Although modern antitrust law typically views the Chicago and post-Chicago Schools as 
the dominant opposing viewpoints, the Chicago School initially arose as a reaction to a different 
movement: the Populist School that dominated antitrust thinking prior to the 1970s.7 Echoing 
Louis Brandeis’s concerns about the “curse of bigness,”8 the Populist School rejected economic 
welfare as the sole focus of antitrust and instead embraced a plural approach that included a wide 
range of noneconomic concerns, reflected in previous antitrust symposia published in this journal 
in 1977 and 1979.9 These scholars embraced a Jeffersonian conception of an economy comprised 
of small firms,10 complete freedom of choice by sellers and buyers,11 and the promotion wealth 
 
7 For a useful overview of this conflict, see Michael S. Jacobs, An Essay on the Normative Foundations of Antitrust 
Economics, 74 N.C. L. REV. 219, 234-40 (1995). 
8 Louis D. Brandeis, A Curse of Bigness, HARPER’S WKLY., Jan. 10, 1914, at 18. This theme is so influential in 
Brandeis’s work that an editor chose to use it as the title for a collection of Brandeis’s papers. THE CURSE OF 
BIGNESS: MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS OF LOUIS D. BRANDEIS (Osmond K. Fraenkel ed., 1935). 
9 Antitrust Jurisprudence: A Symposium on the Economic, Political and Social Goals of Antitrust Policy, 125 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1182 (1977); Symposium on Antitrust Law and Economics, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 918 (1979). 
10 See Kenneth G. Elzinga, The Goals of Antitrust: Other than Competition and Efficiency, What Else Counts?, 125 
U. PA. L. REV. 1191, 1196 (1977) (“The preference for small rather than large business units would appear to be an 
ideal candidate for an antitrust equity goal and one readily achieved through a strict policy against mergers and the 
more frequent use of dissolution decrees.”); see also, e.g., Eleanor M. Fox, The Modernization of Antitrust: A New 
Equilibrium, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 1140, 1150-51 (1981) (noting how the authors of a 1950 amendment of the 
antitrust laws “wished to preserve a society of small, independent, decentralized businesses”). 
11 See Elzinga, supra note 10, at 1200 (identifying individual liberty as an important equity objective of antitrust 
enforcement); see also Fox, supra note 10, at 1151-52 (noting that Supreme Court decisions in the 1960s and 1970s 
“protected the freedom of the independent trader to sell where and to whom the seller pleased”); Thomas E. Kauper, 
The “Warren Court” and the Antitrust Laws: Of Economics, Populism, and Cynicism, 67 MICH. L. REV. 325, 332 
(1968) (“[T]he Court has proceeded with a method of analysis placing primary emphasis on equality of opportunity, 
free access to markets by competing sellers, and complete freedom of choice by buyers.”). 
redistribution,12 along with expanding purely economic considerations to include political 
concerns13 and a preference for per se rules.14 
The Supreme Court decisions of the era largely reflected the views of the Populist 
School, striking down mergers by firms controlling as little as five percent of the market15 and 
declaring a wide range of business practices illegal per se without any inquiry into market 
power.16 In addition, the initial 1968 Merger Guidelines promulgated by the Department of 
Justice under the leadership of Harvard School scholar Donald Turner were skeptical about 
horizontal mergers in concentrated markets that would create firms with as little as eight percent 
market share and disfavored any vertical merger involving firms holding as little as six to ten 
percent of the market.17 
 
12 See Elzinga, supra note 10, at 1194-96 (advocating for including the redistribution of income as a goal of 
antitrust); see also, e.g., Eleanor M. Fox, Consumer Beware Chicago, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1714, 1714-15, 1714 n.3 
(1986) (arguing that the goals of antitrust should include the redistribution of wealth in addition to economic 
efficiency). 
13 See John J. Flynn, Introduction: Antitrust Jurisprudence: A Symposium on the Economic, Political and Social 
Goals of Antitrust Policy, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1182, 1186-90 (acknowledging arguments that antitrust should include 
political and social goals as well as the goal of economic efficiency); Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content of 
Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1051, 1051 (1979) (arguing for a consideration of political values when interpreting 
antitrust law); Louis B. Schwartz, “Justice” and Other Non-Economic Goals of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1076, 
1078, 1080 (1979) (agreeing with Pitofsky that political considerations should represent a central consideration of 
antitrust and not just a “tie-breaker in individual cases”). 
14 Pitofsky, supra note 13, at 1058 (noting with approval that antitrust “occasionally disregards claims of efficiency, 
as in the imposition of per se rules against certain kinds of horizontal cartels”); Schwartz, supra note 13, at 1081 
(arguing that “proper deference to the non-economic goals of antitrust” involved receptivity to per se rules); see also 
Fox, supra note 10, at 1183-85 (advocating for the retention of a number of per se rules for reasons aside from 
economic efficiency). 
15 See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562, 568, 578 (1972) (condemning vertical merger that 
would have resulted in 10% market share); United States v. Von’s Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 271-72, 279 (1966) 
(condemning horizontal merger that would have resulted in 7.5% market share); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 
370 U.S. 294, 343-44, 346 (1962) (condemning horizontal merger that would have resulted in 5% market share); 
Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 295, 314 (1949) (condemning exclusive dealing contract 
that would have foreclosed 16% of the market). 
16 See, e.g., Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 153 (1968) (holding maximum retail price maintenance illegal 
per se); United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 382 (1967) (holding nonprice vertical restraints 
illegal per se); Klor’s, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212 (1959) (holding group boycotts illegal 
per se); N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5, 7-8 (1958) (holding tying illegal per se); Dr. Miles Med. Co. 
v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 394, 408-09 (1911) (holding minimum retail price maintenance illegal 
per se). 
17 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MERGER GUIDELINES §§ 5, 12 (1968), 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2007/07/11/11247.pdf [https://perma.cc/ES5W-Q26B]. 
The Chicago School challenged each of these commitments. In particular, it rejected 
populists’ advocacy for continuing to base antitrust on a plurality of considerations in favor of 
making economic efficiency and consumer welfare the sole guide to antitrust law.18 This early 
Chicago work was backed by empirical scholarship,19 a fact noted even by notable Chicago 
School critics.20 Not all Chicago School supporters agreed: some supporters have called for even 
more empiricism,21 while others have seen Chicago School scholars (and indeed the entire field 
of industrial organization) turning away from empiricism in the 1980s.22 
The Chicago School scored some important victories over the Populist School in the 
Supreme Court, which increasingly framed antitrust law in terms of consumer welfare23 and 
 
18 See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 79–89 (1978) (concluding that “the case is overwhelming 
for judicial adherence to the single goal of consumer welfare in the interpretation of the antitrust laws” and 
advocating for “[e]xclusive adherence to a consumer welfare standard”); RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 18–
20 (1976) (entertaining and rejecting “[s]ociopolitical [o]bjections” to monopolies including “promot[ing] economic 
efficiency . . . to promote small business”). 
19 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements and the Rule of Reason, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 135, 151 n.31 
(1984) (noting the existence of an empirical literature testing the structure-conduct-performance paradigm and 
whether certain practices constitute barriers to entry, and citing multiple examples); Joshua D. Wright, Abandoning 
Antitrust’s Chicago Obsession: The Case for Evidence-Based Antitrust, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 241, 246-47, 247 nn.22-
27 (2012) (calling empiricism “[t]he second defining feature of the Chicago School of antitrust” (after price theory), 
and citing multiple sources). 
20 See F.M. Scherer, Some Principles for Post-Chicago Antitrust Analysis, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 5, 7 (2001) 
(“One of the great Chicago traditions for students seeking the Ph.D. in industrial organization was to carry out 
careful, price theory-based empirical studies of specific real-world industries and institutions.”). 
21 See Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925, 931 n.13 (1979) (“It is 
a curiosity, and a source of regret, that to this day very few of [Chicago School scholar Aaron] Director’s ideas have 
been subjected to systematic empirical examination.”). 
22 See E. Glen Weyl, Price Theory, 57 J. ECON. LITERATURE 329, 354 (2019) (“Price theory also receded from 
applied work for the twenty years starting in the 1980’s . . . .”); Crane, supra note 4, at 1931-32 (calling for the neo-
Chicago School to put greater emphasis on empirical work). The retreat from empiricism was part of a discipline-
wide trend that was not unique to the Chicago School. See Timothy J. Muris, Improving the Economic Foundations 
of Competition Policy, 12 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1, 7 (2003) (“Although IO [industrial organization] was once a 
largely empirical discipline, in recent decades empirical research has lost much of its market share. The lure of IO 
for most young economists was to apply modern mathematical economics to the relatively undeveloped turf of 
industrial organization.”). 
23 See Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2290 (2018) (citing with approval precedent recognizing that the 
legality of a vertical restraint turned on whether it would enhance both “competition and consumer welfare”); 
Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 902, 906 (2007) (overruling antitrust precedent 
because failure to do so would “hinder[] competition and consumer welfare” and rejecting rationales that are 
“[d]ivorced from competition and consumer welfare”); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 
549 U.S. 312, 324 (2007) (citing with approval precedent permitting practices under which “consumer welfare is 
 
economic efficiency.24 Consistent with this emphasis on economic effects, the Supreme Court 
gradually overruled the cases holding vertical contractual restraints per se illegal,25 a 
development that participants in this symposium applauded as wise.26 
Even Populist School supporters came to acknowledge that economic efficiency had 
become the central concern of antitrust.27 In the words of one commentator, by the mid-1990s, 
“the debate about the organizing values of antitrust ha[d] lost its drama,” and “[t]he victory of a 
purely economic analysis over . . . the Modern Populist School could hardly seem more 
complete.”28 Still, as we shall see in Part III.A, the issue has arisen once again in the debate over 
neo-Brandeisian/hipster antitrust. 
 
enhanced”); Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 221, 224 (1993) (noting 
criticism of precedent that is “at odds with the antitrust laws’ traditional concern for consumer welfare and price 
competition” and supporting a recoupment prerequisite in predatory pricing because without it, “consumer welfare is 
enhanced” by the practice); Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 107 
(1984) (noting that “Congress designed the Sherman Act as a ‘consumer welfare prescription’” (quoting Reiter v. 
Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979)). 
24 See United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 441 n.16 (1978) (making the appropriateness of a per se 
rule turn on whether the practice in question tends to “increase economic efficiency and render markets more, rather 
than less, competitive”); see also Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1979) 
(quoting language from U.S. Gypsum Co. with approval); Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & 
Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 289-90, 295 (1985) (quoting language from U.S. Gypsum Co. and Broadcast Music, Inc. 
with approval). 
25 See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 882, 887-907 (overruling the per se rule banning minimum retail price maintenance); 
State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 7, 10-22 (1997) (overruling the per se rule banning maximum retail price 
maintenance); Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 47-59 (1977) (overruling the per se rule 
banning nonprice vertical restraints). 
26 See Hovenkamp & Scott Morton, supra note 2, at 1870 (noting that “the Supreme Court wisely overruled the per 
se rules against” vertical contractual restraints); see also id. at 1845 (noting that Chicago School advocacy for 
overruling precedents prohibiting “competitively harmless vertical contracting . . . . very likely increased consumer 
welfare and efficiency”); Gavil & Salop, supra note 3, at 2125 (observing that the abandonment of per se illegality 
for vertical restraints reflects the influence of the Chicago School). 
27 See, e.g., Fox, supra note 10, at 1140 (“Regard for efficiency is in the ascendancy”); Henry S. Gerla, A Micro-
Microeconomic Approach to Antitrust Law: Games Managers Play, 86 MICH. L. REV. 892, 892 (1988) (“Classical 
microeconomic theory . . . has become the dominant tool for contemporary antitrust analysis.”); Robert H. Lande, 
Implications of Professor Scherer’s Research for the Future of Antitrust, 29 WASHBURN L.J. 256, 258 (1990) 
(“[T]he dominant paradigm today is that the only goal of the existing antitrust laws is to increase economic 
efficiency . . . .”); Lawrence A. Sullivan, Antitrust, Microeconomics, and Politics: Reflections on Some Recent 
Relationships, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 2 (1980) (“The Supreme Court is increasingly committed to a conception of 
competition that emphasizes efficiency as a dominant social value.”); see also, e.g., Christopher S. Yoo, Beyond 
Network Neutrality, 19 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 55 (2005) (“By the end of the 1980s, even those sympathetic to the 
Populist School were forced to concede that the economic approach to antitrust had prevailed.”). 
28 Jacobs, supra note 7, at 238, 239. 
It would be a mistake, however, to attribute the emergence of economic considerations as 
the exclusive touchstone of antitrust law solely to the Chicago School. Strikingly, the consumer 
welfare standard also drew support from the Harvard School, which “underwent a significant 
transformation in the late 1970s” from the interventionist position it took in the 1930s to 1960s.29 
This new Harvard School agreed with the Chicago School’s rejection of populist considerations 
as motivating concerns for antitrust law,30 as symposium participants have recognized,31 
although the Harvard School was influenced more by institutional competence and other process-
based considerations than the broad conceptual economic framework that motivated the Chicago 
School.32 This concurrence was tacit, in that Harvard School scholars did not explicitly connect 
their positions to the Chicago School’s.33 
 
29 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE 37 (2005). A key factor in this “metamorphosis was the 
unacknowledged conversion experience of Donald F. Turner.” Id. 
30 See, e.g., 1 PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW ¶¶ 103-113, at 7, 12-13, 24, 30 (1978) 
(concluding that the case law “support[s] the priority of competition and its efficiency goals,” that promoting non-
efficiency goals would be “[e]xcessively [c]ostly, [f]utile, or unadministrable,” and that “the contribution to populist 
goals from rules specially created to promote them would be far too small to warrant the inevitable legal difficulties, 
uncertainties, and enforcement costs they would involve”); Donald F. Turner, The Durability, Relevance, and Future 
of American Antitrust Policy, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 797, 798 (1987) (“[I]t is questionable whether populist goals are 
appropriate factors to consider when formulating antitrust rules.”); see also Phillip Areeda, Introduction to Antitrust 
Economics, 52 ANTITRUST L.J. 523, 535, 537 (1983) (concluding that when political and social values and 
efficiency values diverge, “there surely is a strong presumption in favor of preferring customers” and that 
“[a]ntitrust law has far more to fear from surrendering to vague claims of fairness or socio-political ends than from 
disinclined inquiry into how challenged arrangements actually serve or impair competition,” while cautioning 
against drawing broad abstract conclusions); Thomas C. Arthur, Workable Antitrust Law: The Statutory Approach to 
Antitrust, 62 TUL. L. REV. 1163, 1166-67 (1988) (noting that both the Harvard and Chicago Schools agree that the 
Populist School’s “use of noneconomic factors confuses and distorts antitrust decisionmaking”); Kovacic, supra 
note 6, at 35 (“Although Chicago School and Harvard School scholars do not define efficiency identically, the two 
schools discourage consideration of non-efficiency objectives such as the dispersion of political power and the 
preservation of opportunities for smaller enterprises to compete.” (footnote omitted)). 
31 Hovenkamp & Scott Morton, supra note 2, at 1874-75 (noting that the total welfare conception “was historically 
controlling in both Harvard and Chicago School economics literature, without significant dissent,” with the standard 
eventually shifting to consumer welfare) (citing Alan J. Meese, Debunking the Purchaser Welfare Account of 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act: How Harvard Brought Us a Total Welfare Standard and Why We Should Keep It, 85 
N.Y.U L. REV. 659, 690 (2010)). 
32 Crane, supra note 4, at 1919-20; Kovacic, supra note 6, at 41 (arguing that the Chicago School was more 
conceptually based on certain economic models, while the Harvard School emphasized “institutional competence” 
and “legal process” (quoting Page, supra note 6, at 912-13)). 
33 Kovacic, supra note 6, at 40 (“In their co-authored works, Areeda and Turner seldom acknowledged intellectual 
debts to other commentators. Their joint work contains few direct statements or indirect signs (e.g., citation patterns) 
 
The Chicago and Harvard Schools’ concurrence on the primacy of economic 
considerations rendered the Populist School’s position untenable.34 Once the Chicago and 
Harvard Schools agreed that economic analysis should be the heart of antitrust, debates over 
antitrust law became what Michael Jacobs called an “intramural dispute” over the type of 
economic analysis to apply.35 The commitment to economic analysis over populist 
considerations is also shared by the post-Chicago School.36 
The fact that both of the leading antitrust schools of thought supported treating consumer 
welfare and economic efficiency as the sole goal of antitrust should not take away from the 
Chicago School’s contribution. It is telling that when endorsing consumer welfare as the antitrust 
standard, the Supreme Court cited Chicagoan Robert Bork37 and not the Harvard School 
scholarship adopting the same position.38 Tellingly, both critics and supporters give the Chicago 
School most of the credit for the Supreme Court’s adoption of the consumer welfare standard.39 
 
that indicate significant borrowings from Chicago School scholars or other researchers.” (footnote omitted)); Page, 
supra note 6, at 911 (noting that Areeda “did not often cite Chicago scholars, but neither did he disagree with them 
directly” (footnote omitted)). Chicago Scholars were less hesitant in drawing connections to the Harvard School. 
See, e.g., Posner, supra note 21, at 925 (noting the “growing consensus” between the Chicago and Harvard Schools 
that focused more on “technical disagreements” than on “disagreement over basic premises, methodology, and 
ideology”). 
34 See Thomas E. Kauper, supra note 6, at 40, 42 (describing how “Chicago’s influence is virtually conceded”); 
Crane, supra note 4, at 1918–20 (describing how the Chicago School and Harvard School have influenced the Court 
and both “tend toward similar noninterventionist results”); William E. Kovacic, The Chicago Obsession in the 
Interpretation of US Antitrust History, 87 U. CHI. L. REV. 460, 479 (2020) (“Bork inspired the right, and Areeda and 
Turner brought along centrists and somewhat left-of-center academics, enforcement officials, judges, and 
practitioners.”). 
35 Jacobs, supra note 7, at 222; accord, e.g., Jonathan B. Baker, Recent Developments in Economics that Challenge 
Chicago School Views, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 645, 646 (1989) (“[W]e need not reject the value of economic efficiency 
in order to question the Chicago School. These challenges to Chicago arise from within the efficiency paradigm.”). 
36 See, e.g., Baker, supra note 35, at 646 n.7 (“Some new developments support rather than challenge Chicago 
positions.”); Jacobs, supra note 7, at 222, 242 (describing how the post-Chicago school has “eschew[ed] the 
subjective inquiries” that were common in the “political approaches of the past”). 
37 Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979). 
38 See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
39 See, e.g., Daniel A. Crane, Antitrust’s Unconventional Politics, 104 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 118, 123 (2018) 
(“Beginning in 1977–78, the Chicago School achieved an almost complete triumph in the Supreme Court, at least in 
the limited sense that the Court came to adopt the economic efficiency/consumer welfare model as the exclusive or 
near-exclusive goal of antitrust law.”); Kenneth Heyer, Consumer Welfare and the Legacy of Robert Bork, 57 J.L. & 
 
Robert Pitofsky summed up this consensus nicely when he found it “unanimous” that the 
Chicago School had “demolished some aspects of the antitrust approach of the 1950s and 1960s 
(Warren Court period) and eventually displaced it with a more rigorous approach” that 
“emphasized exclusively economic considerations (to the complete exclusion of other social and 
political values).”40 
B. Price Theory 
While the Chicago School’s advocacy for making economics the sole focus of antitrust 
law ultimately prevailed, its arguments in support of its preferred mode of economic analysis 
achieved somewhat more mixed results. The Chicago School was forthright in its preference for 
neoclassical price theory.41 Built on the work of such giants as Alfred Marshall and Paul 
Samuelson, price theory has been defined as “the explanation of how relative prices are 
determined,” primarily through industry-level analyses of supply and demand and “how prices 
function to coordinate economic activity.”42 Unlike the case study approach of the original 
Harvard School, which explored the variations in the details of different industries and firms,43 
price theory “simplif[ies] a rich (high-dimensional heterogeneity, many agent, dynamics, etc.) 
 
ECON. (SPECIAL ISSUE) S19, S20, S32 (2014) (noting that “Bork was not the first to propose the total-welfare 
standard,” but “[h]e was . . . its most influential advocate” and concluding that “Bork not only won the battle, he 
also won the war”). 
40 Robert Pitofsky, Introduction to Conservative Economic Analysis and Its Effects, in HOW THE CHICAGO SCHOOL 
OVERSHOT THE MARK, supra note 1, at 7, 7. 
41 See BORK, supra note 18, at 116-17 (describing the relationship between antitrust and price theory and stating 
“[t]here is no body of knowledge other than conventional price theory that can serve as a guide to the effects of 
business behavior upon consumer welfare”); Kobayashi & Muris, supra note 4, at 154 (describing the “application 
of price theory and other economics” as “the hallmark of Chicago School/Aaron Director analysis”); Posner, supra 
note 21, at 928 (“Director’s conclusions resulted simply from viewing antitrust policy through the lens of price 
theory.”); Wright, supra note 19, at 245 (identifying the “rigorous application of price theory” as one of the 
“defining characteristics of the Chicago School”). 
42 DAVID D. FRIEDMAN, PRICE THEORY 27 (1986). 
43 See generally Hovenkamp & Scott Morton, supra note 2; Herbert Hovenkamp Reimagining Antitrust: The 
Revisionist Work of Richard S. Markovits, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1221 (2016) (reviewing RICHARD S. MARKOVITS, 
ECONOMICS AND THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF U.S. AND E.U. ANTITRUST LAW (2014)). 
and often incompletely specified model for the purposes of answering a simple (scalar or low-
dimensional) allocative question.”44 
Even critics of the Chicago School’s price theoretic approach have generally recognized 
that it has influenced Supreme Court doctrine. The adoption of pricing below cost as the 
appropriate test of predatory pricing45 was a clear endorsement of price theory.46 With respect to 
the leverage theory of tying, another Chicago School target,47 the Court abandoned the idea that 
a showing of market power was unnecessary48 and returned to subjecting tying claims to a 
market power requirement.49 Participants in this symposium recognized that the leverage theory 
 
44 E. Glen Weyl, Price Theory, 57 J. ECON. LIT. 329, 330 (2019). 
45 See Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 222-27 (1992) (requiring a showing 
of pricing below a rival’s appropriate costs to recover on a predatory pricing complaint); Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of 
Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 117 (1986) (defining predatory pricing as “pricing below an appropriate measure of cost” 
that eliminates or reduces competition); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 584 n.8 
(1986) (describing predatory pricing as when “a single firm . . . cuts its prices in order to force competitors out of the 
market”). 
46 See Patrick Bolton, Joseph F. Brodley & Michael H. Riordan, Predatory Pricing: Response to Critique and 
Further Elaboration, 89 GEO. L.J. 2495, 2506 (2001) (recognizing and criticizing the fact that Brooke Group relied 
on price theory); John J. Flynn, Antitrust Policy and the Concept of a Competitive Process, 35 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 
893, 895 n.4 (1990) (noting how Matsushita reflected “[t]he capture of the Court’s understanding of the facts and 
law by conclusions of neoclassical price theory”); John J. Flynn, Antitrust Policy, Innovation Efficiencies, and the 
Suppression of Technology, 66 ANTITRUST L.J. 487, 490 n.10 (1998) (noting how Brooke Group relied on 
neoclassical price theory); Thomas E. Kauper, The Sullivan Approach to Horizontal Restraints, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 
893, 903 (1987) (noting that in Matsushita, “the Court relied to an extraordinary degree on neoclassical price theory 
to resolve ambiguities in evidence concerning alleged predation”). 
47 Ward S. Bowman, Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19 (1957); accord Posner, 
supra note 21, at 926 (noting that one of the Chicago school’s “key ideas” is related to “tie-in[s]”). 
48 See N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 11 (1958) (finding that “‘monopoly power’ or ‘dominance’ over 
the tying product” is not “a necessary precondition for application of the rule of per se unreasonableness to tying 
arrangements”). 
49 See Jefferson Par. Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 18 (1984) (“[W]e must consider whether . . . 
[petitioners] have used their market power to force their patients to accept the tying arrangement.”); Alan J. Meese, 
Tying Meets the New Institutional Economics: Farewell to the Chimera of Forcing, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 34-35 
(1997) (noting that Jefferson Parish appeared to hold that “a plaintiff had to prove that the defendant had market 
power of the sort that is required for liability in other antitrust contexts”). As Gavil and Salop note, the Chicago 
School had an even bigger impact on Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in Jefferson Parish, which embraced the 
single monopoly rent theorem that motivated much of the Chicago School’s critique. Gavil & Salop, supra note 3, at 
2126. 
used to justify treating tying as illegal per se without any showing of foreclosure or exclusion 
was based on “mistaken arithmetic.”50 
Price theory is also often credited as playing a role in the Supreme Court’s decisions 
eliminating the per se rule for retail price maintenance51 and abolishing the presumption that 
patents create market power.52 With respect to oligopoly more generally, Twombly’s, Brooke 
Group’s, and Matsushita’s skepticism towards oligopoly coordination in the absence of specific 
agreement53 also arguably reflects the Chicago School’s price-theoretically influenced belief that 
absent collusion, oligopoly would pose a problem only at high levels of concentration.54 
 
50 Hovenkamp & Scott Morton, supra note 2, at 1865; see also Gavil & Salop, supra note 3, at 2125-26 (noting that 
“[t]he per se prohibition of tying is teetering” because of the influence of the Chicago School). 
51 Alan Devlin, On the Ramifications of Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.: Are Tie-Ins Next?, 56 
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 387, 388, 390 (2008) (characterizing “[t]he Supreme Court’s 2007 decision in Leegin. . . [as] a 
long overdue implementation of ubiquitously accepted principles of price theory” and a “major step toward 
obeisance to the Chicago School’s focus on price theory”); Norman W. Hawker, Antitrust Insights from Strategic 
Management, 47 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 67, 84 (2003) (“Relying heavily on this hard form of price theory, the 
Supreme Court struck down the per se rule against territorial restrictions and maximum resale price maintenance 
. . . .”); see also Michael S. Jacobs, The New Sophistication in Antitrust, 79 MINN. L. REV. 1, 48 (1994) (“The 
revitalization of the rule of reason owed much to the Chicago school and its use of price theory to expose the flawed 
economic premises underlying many of the old per se rules.”). For a classic price theoretic Chicago School argument 
against per se illegality for resale price maintenance, see Robert H. Bork, Resale Price Maintenance and Consumer 
Welfare, 77 YALE L.J. 950 (1968). 
52 Devlin, supra note 51, at 391, 391 n.28 (noting how “Chicago-driven principles of price theory” led the Supreme 
Court to eliminate “the presumption that patents confer market power” in Illinois Tool). For the classic Chicago 
School statement that “a patent is not usually a monopoly in the sense of price theory”, see Edmund W. Kitch, 
Patents, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 13, 14 (1998). 
53 See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007) (holding that “stating [a Sherman Act § 1] claim 
requires a complaint with enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest that an agreement was made” and “an 
allegation of parallel conduct and a bare assertion of conspiracy will not suffice”); Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & 
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 223 (1993) (“As a general rule, the exclusionary effect of prices above a 
relevant measure of cost . . . represents competition on the merits, or is beyond the practical ability of a judicial 
tribunal to control without courting intolerable risks of chilling legitimate price cutting.”); Matsushita Elec. Indus. 
Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585-88 (1986) (“To survive a motion for summary judgment or for a 
directed verdict, a plaintiff seeking damages for a violation of § 1 must present evidence ‘that tends to exclude the 
possibility’ that the alleged conspirators acted independently.”) (quoting Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 
465 U.S. 752, 764 (1984)). 
54 Posner, supra note 21, at 933 (citing the work of George Stigler); accord Richard S. Markovits, A Response to 
Professor Posner, 28 STAN. L. REV. 919, 920 n.8 (1976) (similarly recognizing Stigler’s work as an application of 
price theory to oligopoly). But see Steven C. Salop, Understanding Richard Posner on Exclusionary Conduct, 
ANTITRUST SOURCE, Oct. 2018, at 1, 8 (“[W]hile [Posner] characterizes Stigler’s famous oligopoly collusion model 
as price theory, that model really is game theoretic.” (footnote omitted)). 
Symposium participants generally acknowledge that this development reflects the influence of 
the Chicago School.55 
Regarding mergers, the 1984 revision to the Department of Justice Merger Guidelines 
raised the relevant concentration thresholds above those contained in the 1968 Guidelines56 and 
favored by the Populist School.57 Commentators have noted the close connection between the 
revisions to the Merger Guidelines and price theory,58 and symposium participants explicitly 
recognized that the revised Guidelines reflected the influence of Chicago views59 and that the 
move away from “condemning very small horizontal mergers . . . very likely increased consumer 
welfare and efficiency.”60 
A close examination of antitrust scholarship and judicial decisions reveals that the forces 
driving these doctrinal changes are more complex than often recognized. On the one hand, the 
Harvard School exhibited greater openness to price theory following Donald Turner’s 
“unacknowledged conversion experience” that marks the dividing line between the Harvard 
School of the 1930s through the 1960s from the “new Harvard” position.61 In addition, new 
 
55 See Baker & Farrell, supra note 3, at 2006, 2007 n.96 (stating that “[t]he Chicago perspective . . . led the 
Supreme Court in Brooke Group to take the view that oligopoly coordination is hard to achieve and unstable,” and 
that Matsushita and Twombly have “made it more difficult to use Section 1 of the Sherman Act to challenge 
coordinated oligopoly outcomes”); Gavil & Salop, supra note 3, at 2125-26 (stating that the Chicago School 
criticisms of antitrust law have “been highly influential” and citing to Matsushita, Twombly, and Brooke Group). 
56 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MERGER GUIDELINES § 4.2221 (1984), 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2007/07/11/11249.pdf [http://perma.cc/D24Z-MZBH] (“The 
Department is unlikely to challenge a merger on this ground unless . . . overall concentration of the upstream market 
is above 1800 HHI . . . .”). 
57 See Christopher S. Yoo, Vertical Integration and Media Regulation in the New Economy, 19 YALE J. ON REG. 
171, 187 (2002) (“[T]he Harvard School approach . . . became enshrined in the [1968] Merger Guidelines . . . .”). 
58 Robert G. Harris & Thomas M. Jorde, Market Definition in the Merger Guidelines: Implications for Antitrust 
Enforcement, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 464, 476 (1983) (noting and criticizing the fact that “[t]he Guidelines are founded 
on neoclassical price theory”). 
59 Baker & Farrell, supra note 3, at 2008 (“The 1982 Merger Guidelines were predicated on a Chicagoan view of 
oligopolistic coordination.”). 
60 Hovenkamp & Scott Morton, supra note 2, at 1845. 
61 HOVENKAMP, supra note 29, at 37 (noting that “the Harvard School underwent a significant transformation in the 
late 1970s” that “departed significantly from Harvard orthodoxy” developed in the 1930s through the 1960s); Crane, 
 
Harvard School scholars joined in the attack on leverage theory,62 a point often lost on 
Chicagoans.63 Similarly, Areeda and Turner’s endorsement of cost as the test for predation in 
their landmark article on predatory pricing64 was, in Posner’s words, “pure textbook price theory 
unadorned by any of the concepts of industrial organization,” such as strategic behavior.65 That 
said, their advocacy of average variable cost over marginal cost as the more administrable 
second-best test for predation represented a fusion of price theory with classic Harvard School 
institutional concerns.66 
Conversely, Chicago School scholarship incorporated forms of economic analysis beyond 
price theory. For example, some Chicago School arguments invoked transaction cost 
economics,67 which became the basis of the Supreme Court’s landmark Sylvania decision.68 
Chicagoans have similarly noted that the Chicago School “leaned heavily on neoclassical price 
theory, but also relied upon the economics of information, the economics of price discrimination, 
 
supra note 4, at 45 (drawing a similar distinction between “Paleo-Harvard” and “Neo-Harvard”); William E. 
Kovacic, The Chicago Obsession in the Interpretation of US Antitrust History, 87 U. CHI. L. REV. 459, 467-68 
(2020) (“The Harvard School . . . encompasses two periods of thought—the intervention-friendly structure-conduct-
performance thinking from the 1930s into the 1960s, and a more cautious perspective, anchored in institutional 
considerations popularized by Phillip Areeda, which emerged from the 1970s onward.”). 
62 Hovenkamp & Scott Morton, supra note 2, at 1865. 
63 See Herbert Hovenkamp, United States Competition Policy in Crisis: 1890–1955, 94 MINN. L. REV. 311, 365–66 
(2009) (noting that the critique of the leverage theory “has been considered a core principle of the Chicago School 
critique of the Harvard School,” but “the leveraging theory never held a secure place in . . . the writings of Harvard 
School economists”). 
64 Hovenkamp & Scott Morton, supra note 2, at 1867 (noting that the Supreme Court adopted the Areeda-Turner 
test); Kovacic, supra note 6, at 46 (“[T]he article became the starting point for judicial analysis of below-cost 
pricing claims.”). 
65 Posner, supra note 2121, at 940; accord Kenneth G. Elzinga & David E. Mills, Predatory Pricing and Strategic 
Theory, 89 GEO. L.J. 2475, 2476 (2001) (noting that Areeda and Turner’s article injected price theory into the 
analysis of predatory pricing); Nicola Giocoli, Games Judges Don’t Play: Predatory Pricing and Strategic 
Reasoning in US Antitrust, 21 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 271, 279-280 (2014) (noting that Areeda & Turner’s predatory 
pricing test “came directly from price theory”). 
66 Kovacic, supra note 6, at 42–50. 
67 Alan J. Meese, Price Theory and Vertical Restraints: A Misunderstood Relation, 45 UCLA L. REV. 143, 203 
(1997) (“Despite references by Chicagoans to ‘price theory,’ Chicago’s approach to vertical restraints has never 
rested upon . . . price theory. Instead, the Chicago approach to vertical restraints is an application of [New 
Institutional Economics] . . . .”). 
68 Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 54-57 (1977). 
the theory of the firm, the theory of public goods, the theory of natural monopoly, and even game 
theory.”69 And Chicagoans and critics both credit the Chicago School for pioneering modern 
theories of strategic conduct, such as raising rivals’ costs.70 
Moreover, as the Chicago School’s supporters themselves recognized, its victory was far 
from complete in the Supreme Court.71 With respect to vertical restraints, rather than follow the 
Chicago School’s call for per se legality,72 the Supreme Court instead subjected them to the rule 
of reason,73 a decision more in line with new Harvard School thinking.74 Supreme Court 
decisions also reflect an embrace of decision theory75 that places greater emphasis on the 
potential adverse impact of false positives than on false negatives.76 Although the adoption of an 
 
69 Kobayashi & Muris, supra note 4, at 152 (footnotes omitted). 
70 RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 251 (2d ed. 2001); Steven C. Salop, Economic Analysis of Exclusionary 
Vertical Conduct: Where Chicago Has Overshot the Mark, in HOW THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE MARK, 
supra note 1, at 141, 144 (“[I]t is important to recognize that [raising rivals’ cost] has its roots in the economic 
analysis of Chicago School commentators.”); Peter C. Carstensen, Director and Levi After 40 Years: The Anti-
Antitrust Agenda Revisited, 17 MISS. C. L. REV. 37, 40 (1996) (discussing how Director and Levi advanced a 
“precursor of . . . the raising rivals’ costs hypothesis”); Kobayashi & Muris, supra note 4, at 161-62 (concluding that 
Chicago’s recognition of a raising rivals’ costs theory “clearly exposes the fallacy of those who argue that Chicago 
conveniently ignored relevant theories on ideological grounds”). For the seminal Chicago School articulation of 
raising rivals’ costs, see Aaron Director & Edward H. Levi, Law and the Future: Trade Regulation, 51 NW. U. L. 
REV. 281, 290, 293 (1956). 
71 See, e.g., Sam Peltzman, Aaron Director’s Influence on Antitrust Policy, 48 J.L. & ECON. 313, 325-28 (2005) 
(finding that the Chicago School had effected a major change in predatory pricing, earned a “partial victory” on 
vertical restraints, and had minimal impact on the leverage theory of tying). 
72 See BORK, supra note 18, at 288 (“Analysis shows that every vertical restraint should be completely lawful.”); 
Richard A. Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted Distribution: Per Se Legality, 48 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 6, 22–25 (1981) (advocating for “the rule of per se legality” in certain circumstances, including “price as 
well as nonprice cases”). 
73 See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 882, 887–907 (2007) (rejecting the 
rule of per se invalidity and adopting the rule of reason instead); State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 7, 22 (1997) 
(same); Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 47–59 (1977) (using the rule of reason standard as 
opposed to any per se prohibition). 
74 See Hovenkamp & Scott Morton, supra note 2, at 1870 (“While the Supreme Court wisely overruled the per se 
rules against nonprice restraints and [resale price maintenance], it adopted the rule of reason advocated by the 
Harvard School, rather than the Chicago preference for rules of per se legality.”); see also Elhauge, supra note 5, at 
59 (“[O]n every issue the Court has addressed where [the Harvard School and the Chicago School] are in conflict, 
the Supreme Court has sided with the Harvard school.”). 
75 See Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 3 (1984) (“[J]udicial errors that tolerate 
baleful practices are self-correcting, while erroneous condemnations are not.”). 
76 See Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 414 (2004) (“The cost of 
false positives counsels against an undue expansion of § 2 liability.”); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio 
 
error-cost framework is often regarded as distinctively Chicagoan,77 key decisions such as 
Trinko supplemented decision theory with Harvard School concerns about institutional 
competence.78 Subsequent revisions to the Horizontal Merger Guidelines in 1992 and 2010 
recognized the importance of potential strategic conduct, both in terms of assessing the 
competitive impact of a merger (such as asking whether one of the merger partners is a 
maverick) and in asking whether the merger would facilitate post-merger unilateral 
anticompetitive conduct,79 developments that symposium participants recognize is distinctly anti-
Chicagoan.80 Moreover, the Supreme Court’s conception of entry barriers remains distinctively 
Harvardian, not Chicagoan.81 
What explains these mixed results? As some participants have noted, the Chicago School 
overreached in some respects, often offering no more than possibility theorems rather than 
 
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 594 (1986) (finding that “mistaken inferences in cases such as this one are especially costly, 
because they chill the very conduct the antitrust laws are designed to protect” and balancing this concern against 
punishing “illegal conspiracies” is “unusually one-sided in cases such as this one”). 
77 Hovenkamp & Scott Morton, supra note 2, at [29–30] (“One important element of the Chicago School’s ideology 
was its analysis of error costs that put large weight on type one errors . . . .”). 
78 Trinko, 540 U.S. at 414-15 (reasoning that “[e]ven if the problem of false positives did not exist,” courts’ 
inability to “‘explain or adequately and reasonably supervise’” duties to deal counsels against recognizing liability 
under the essential facility doctrine (quoting Phillip Areeda, Essential Facilities: An Epithet in Need of Limiting 
Principles, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 841, 853 (1989)). 
79 U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, MERGER GUIDELINES § 2.12 (1992), 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2007/07/11/11250.pdf [https://perma.cc/3XYF-6Y69] 
[hereinafter 1992 MG] (“[An] acquisition of a maverick firm is one way in which a merger may make coordinated 
interaction more likely, more successful, or more complete.”); U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, 
HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES §§ 2.1.5, 6 (2010), 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2010/08/19/hmg-2010.pdf [ https://perma.cc/4V2K-D3CN] 
[hereinafter 2010 HMG] (discussing both whether a firm is a maverick firm and describing certain unilateral effects 
post-merger that would lessen competition). 
80 Baker & Farrell, supra note 3, at 1985-86 (contrasting the 1982 “Chicagoan” Merger Guidelines with later 
Merger Guidelines “rooted in the modern economics of coordination through purposive conduct”). 
81 Jonathan B. Baker, Responding to Developments in Economics and the Courts: Entry in the Merger Guidelines, 
71 ANTITRUST L.J. 189, 193 (2003) (discussing how the FTC’s 1985 Echlin decision was framed as a conflict 
between Bainian and Stiglerian conceptions of entry barriers and noting that “if Stigler won the definitional battle in 
Echlin, Bain won the war”); see also Herbert Hovenkamp, Whatever Did Happen to the Antitrust Movement?, 94 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 583, 614–15 (2018) (“Today it is clear that the Harvard school has won this battle in both the 
caselaw and enforcement policy.”). 
general proofs.82 The explanation for that overreach lies in part in the pro-enforcement context in 
which the Chicago School arose.83 When confronted with a conventional wisdom, particularly in 
the form of a per se prohibition, possibility theorems can serve as a useful disproof by 
counterexample.84 However, mere possibility theorems are insufficient to justify a per se rule 
running in the other direction.85 To this extent, the Chicago School’s inconsistent track record 
may reflect the typical situation in which the pendulum begins moving in one direction to return 
closer to equilibrium, only to swing too far. 
In addition, Chicago School scholars were far more unified in their opposition to the 
existing antitrust jurisprudence of the 1950s and 1960s than they were regarding what should 
replace it.86 As a movement, the Chicago School remains more diverse than is often 
recognized.87 
That said, another more fundamental factor underlay the incomplete reception of Chicago 
School thought, specifically, price theory’s goal of creating a simple, static model of competition 
that cut across market structures and ignored details of different industries and individual firm 
 
82 Hovenkamp & Scott Morton, supra note 2, at 1869-70 (“The Chicago School’s influence on antitrust decision 
making in the federal courts has been more ideological than technical.”). 
83 Id. at 1861 (noting that in the 1980s, enforcement policy began to consider additional factors beyond “pure 
structure”). 
84 See Christopher S. Yoo, Network Neutrality, Consumers, and Innovation, 2008 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 179, 183-85 
(2008). 
85 See id. (describing the use of exemplifying theory by Chicago School theorists to justify a categorical rule in 
which vertical restraints would be per se legal). 
86 Kobayashi & Muris, supra note 4, at 171 (“Chicago had not focused on the many details for antitrust policy that 
would be necessary once the old order was overthrown. There was simply no shared, agreed-upon view regarding 
the myriad aspects of appropriate doctrine.”). 
87 See F.M. Scherer, Conservative Economics and Antitrust: A Variety of Influences, in HOW THE CHICAGO SCHOOL 
OVERSHOT THE MARK, supra note 1, at 30, 32-36 (giving examples to illustrate how the Chicago School was “far 
from monolithic in advocating a retrenchment of antitrust enforcement programs”); Wright, supra note 19, at 244-45 
(stating that the Chicago School does not “represent a monolithic entity”); see also Kovacic, supra note 34, at 468 
(noting how the Chicago school is not “single-minded”); Daniel A. Crane, A Neo-Chicago Perspective on Antitrust 
Institutions, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 43, 44 (2012) (“It is difficult enough to draw the lines around the Chicago 
School . . . .”). 
behavior.88 This blind spot paved the way for the post-Chicago School based on the game theory 
revolution that would soon sweep microeconomics and industrial organization. 
These limitations make blanket claims of the prevalence of price theory feel somewhat 
overblown.89 At the same time, criticisms that the Chicago School has not been influential seem 
equally overstated, as participants in this symposium readily acknowledged.90 Indeed, the fact 
that the Chicago School remains a magnet for so much criticism attests to its enduring 
importance.91 
II. THE POST-CHICAGO REVOLUTION 
The Chicago School spawned a new school whose name, post-Chicago, was inspired by 
Herbert Hovenkamp.92 One surprise is that none of the articles included in a symposium on “The 
Post Chicago Antitrust Revolution” uses the term, let alone identifies the defining characteristics 
of the School. 
Fortunately, other scholarship defines the outlines of the movement clearly enough. As an 
initial matter, the post-Chicago School joins the Chicago School in rejecting populist 
considerations and in accepting the maximization of economic welfare as the sole focus of 
 
88 Hovenkamp & Scott Morton, supra note 2, at 1851. 
89 See, e.g., Posner, supra note 21, at 932 (claiming that price theory “has largely prevailed”). 
90 See, e.g., Baker & Farrell, supra note 3, at 2005-06 (describing the influence of the Chicago School view of 
oligopolies on antitrust enforcement); Gavil & Salop, supra note 3, at 2124-25; Hovenkamp & Scott Morton, supra 
note 2, at 1869. 
91 See, e.g., Kobayashi & Muris, supra note 4, at 169-70 (arguing that the recent book How the Chicago School 
Overshot the Mark “use[s] . . . the term Chicago as a political football” by ignoring Chicago’s commitment to “a 
bottom-up approach based primarily on fact-intensive, case-by-case analysis” and instead oversimplifying it as “a 
universal conservative ideology of antitrust minimalism with a preference for ‘economic models over facts’” (citing 
Robert Pitofsky, Introduction: Setting the Stage, in HOW CHICAGO OVERSHOT THE MARK, supra note 1)); Kovacic, 
supra note 34, at 484-86 (examining “the breadth and power of the Chicago Obsession”); Wright, supra note 19, at 
318-19 (describing antitrust analyses framed as critiques of the Chicago School and noting that “misuses of the term 
‘Chicago School’ . . . come at the expense of serious scientific analysis”). 
92 See Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust After Chicago, 84 MICH. L. REV. 213, 225 (1985) (“[A]ntitrust policy is 
coming increasingly under the influence of a ‘post-Chicago’ economics . . . .”). 
antitrust.93 In the words of Carl Shapiro, “[I]f ‘Post-Chicago Economics’ stands for the notion 
that . . . antitrust should move away from promoting efficiency and consumer welfare, count me 
out.”94 
What separates the two schools is not their goals, but their vision of the relevant 
mechanisms through which economics acts. While the Chicago School placed little emphasis on 
the game theory revolution that swept through industrial organization and microeconomics 
during the beginning in the 1970s,95 the post-Chicago School embraced it.96 
Although the post-Chicago School is often characterized as the inheritor of the legacy of 
the Harvard School, an examination of its premises reveals some stark differences. Unlike the 
Harvard School, which focused almost entirely on market structure without paying any attention 
to conduct, the game theory embraced by the post-Chicago School places strategic behavior at 
the center of the analysis.97 In addition, although post-Chicago analyses are able to take into 
account more complex dynamics than those permitted by the price-theoretic approach of the 
Chicago School, the game-theoretic approach by post-Chicago studies lacks the industry 
 
93 See, e.g., Baker, supra note 35, at 646 (differentiating Post-Chicago from the Populist School and noting that the 
latter’s “challenges to Chicago arise from within the efficiency paradigm”); Jacobs, supra note 7, at 242 (noting that 
post-Chicago and Chicago scholars “share a common metric” in that “[t]hey eschew the multivalent inquiries 
informing the Modern Populists’ approach in favor of the single-minded pursuit of allocative efficiency” and “agree 
that wealth maximization should be the exclusive goal of antitrust policy”). 
94 Carl Shapiro, Aftermarkets and Consumer Welfare: Making Sense of Kodak, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 483, 484 (1995) 
(footnote omitted). 
95 See Hovenkamp & Scott Morton, supra note 2, at 1846-47, 1853 (noting that Robert Bork’s influential Chicago 
School treatise did not use game theory and that the Chicago School “fir[mly] reject[ed]” game theory). But see 
Kobayashi & Muris, supra note 4, at 152, 159 (claiming that some Chicago School analyses relied on game theory) 
(citing George J. Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly, 72 J. POL. ECON. 44 (1964)). 
96 Hovenkamp & Scott Morton, supra note 2, at 1853 (noting that the game theory revolution of the 1970s and 
1980s was an important advance in oligopoly theory); accord HOVENKAMP, supra note 29, at 38 (“[P]ost-Chicago 
theory typically models strategic behavior by use of game theory . . . .”); Ian Ayres, Playing Games with the Law, 42 
STAN. L. REV. 1291, 1315 (1990) (“[T]he new game theory is the core methodology of the new ‘new learning’ in 
industrial organization . . . .”); Jacobs, supra note 7, at 240-45 (tracing the role of game theory in post-Chicago 
analysis). 
97 HOVENKAMP, supra note 29, at 37-38 (identifying the pre-1970 Harvard School idea of empowering the 
government to “break up durable monopolists even if they had not engaged in any unlawful conduct” and 
contrasting it with the post-Chicago School, which relies on game theory and considers “anti-competitive strategic 
behavior” in its analyses). 
specificity inherent in the case study-based approach of the Harvard School. Instead, post-
Chicago models tend to be quite abstract. 
Consider two prominent examples of post-Chicago scholarship. Michael Whinston’s 
famous article showing how tying can lead to exclusion is based on the relative sizes of the 
outside demand for a complementary good and the minimum efficient scale needed to produce it 
efficiently.98 Whinston’s result turns on the relationship between these two numbers without 
taking into account any unique aspects of any particular industry. Thomas Krattenmaker and 
Steven Salop’s now classic article on raising rivals’ costs similarly frames the issues in non-
industry-specific terms by exploring how a firm can use exclusionary rights contracts to restrict 
the competitors’ ability to obtain access to a key input.99 The results turn on a general principle: 
the presence of an upstream-downstream relationship. The details of the specific industry in 
question play little to no role. 
The result is a mathematically driven approach that is quite different from the bottom-up 
empiricism that characterized the Harvard School. Rather than being the inheritor of the Harvard 
School tradition, the post-Chicago School represents something quite different that reflects the 
times during which it arose. 
While the game-theoretic framework that characterizes post-Chicago scholarship yields 
substantial insights, it carries with it a number of limitations, both theoretically and 
 
98 Michael D. Whinston, Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 837 (1990). 
99 Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals’ Costs to Achieve Power 
over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209, 224-27 (1986). 
empirically.100 In addition, many commentators have questioned how much impact post-Chicago 
economics has had on Supreme Court doctrine.101 
A. The Conceptual Limits of Game Theory 
By their nature, the results of post-Chicago models typically derive from the assumption 
that particular decisions must be made in a particular order.102 This results in models that are 
quite stylized. Moreover, scholars have long recognized that the Nash equilibrium-inspired 
solution concepts that form the basis of game theory often yield no equilibria or multiple 
equilibria unless the model makes highly restrictive assumptions.103 When this is the case, the 
details of those assumptions drive the results. 
The dependence of these models on these restrictive assumptions often makes them 
susceptible to large, discontinuous changes in response to small changes to the underlying 
parameters.104 The violation of the Einsteinian admonition that “nature does not jump” raises 
 
100 For an earlier discussion of these limitations in the context of vertical integration, see Christopher S. Yoo, 
Vertical Integration and Media Regulation in the New Economy 19 YALE J. ON REG. 171, 295 (2002). 
101 See, e.g., Christopher J. Sprigman, Monopolization Remedies and Antitrust After the Fall, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 5, 
9 (2009) (“[P]ost-Chicago insights have had little apparent impact in litigation . . . .”). 
102 See Malcolm B. Coate & Jeffrey H. Fischer, Can Post-Chicago Economics Survive Daubert?, 34 AKRON L. REV. 
795, 797 (2001) (“[T]he outcome of a [post-Chicago economics] model often depends on whether customers or 
competitors can undertake strategies to counter the alleged anticompetitive behavior. In other cases, the order in 
which the parties execute strategies is important.” (footnote omitted)). 
103 See Ayres, supra note 96, at 1310-11 (noting the role that restrictive assumptions play in preventing game-
theoretic models from yielding no equilibria or multiple equilibria); Interview with Dennis A. Yao, Former FTC 
Commissioner, ANTITRUST, Fall 1994, at 12, 16 ( “Game-theoretic models generally become unwieldy unless they 
adopt restrictive assumptions”); Michael A. Salinger, Dir., Bureau of Econ., Fed. Trade Comm’n, Is It Live or Is It 
Memorex? Models of Vertical Mergers and Antitrust Enforcement, Speech at Association of Competition 
Economics Seminar on Non-Horizontal Mergers 3-4 (Sept. 7–8, 2005), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/public_statements/it-live-or-it-memorex-models-vertical-mergers-and-antitrust-
enforcement/050927isitlive.pdf [http://perma.cc/TP68-4AKQ] (noting that Post-Chicago theories rely on highly 
stylized assumptions to make the models tractable). 
104 See Ayres, supra note 96, at 1313-14 (“Calculating the comparative statics in game theory models, however, is 
often much more difficult than simply taking derivatives. Moreover, many games exhibit discontinuous changes 
when the underlying structure is changed slightly.”); see also Coate & Fischer, supra note 102, at 823 (“[Post-
Chicago] theories are highly sensitive to the assumptions used.”). 
questions about the accuracy with which these models describe actual competitive processes as 
well as their robustness.105 
Furthermore, post-Chicago models typically do not attempt to formalize the impact of the 
practices in question on welfare.106 A good example is, again, Michael Whinston’s seminal 
article on tying, which explicitly acknowledges that the model does not consider potential 
beneficial motivations for the practice and thus that its welfare implications are ambiguous.107 
This is particularly important because post-Chicago models typically rely on the type of 
concentrated market structures in which vertical coordination is most likely to yield 
efficiencies.108 
B. The Need for More Empirical Validation 
Skeptics have consistently criticized the post-Chicago School for its lack of 
empiricism.109 Although some post-Chicago scholars have asserted that empiricism represents a 
 
105 See Ayres, supra note 96, at 1314. 
106 An exception is Michael A. Salinger, Vertical Mergers and Market Foreclosure, 103 Q.J. ECON. 345, 346 
(1988). 
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108 Keith N. Hylton & Michael Salinger, Tying Law and Policy: A Decision-Theoretic Approach, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 
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monopoly. It is a long-established principle of economics, however, that integrated complementary monopoly 
results in lower prices than distinct complementary monopolies. A public policy that imparts a bias toward 
interdependent complementary monopolies instead of integrated complementary monopolies has the predictable 
consequence of raising prices and reducing consumer welfare.”); Edward A. Snyder & Thomas E. Kauper, Misuse of 
the Antitrust Laws: The Competitor Plaintiff, 90 MICH. L. REV. 551, 589-91 (1991) (tracing the potential efficiency 
benefits and noting that “meeting the necessary conditions for anticompetitive exclusion is likely to ensure that some 
efficiency benefits are realized from the business practices in question”). 
109 See Crane, supra note 4, at 1924-27 (criticizing post-Chicago (as well as Chicago) for its lack of empiricism); 
David S. Evans & Michael Salinger, Competition Thinking at the European Commission: Lessons from the Aborted 
GE/Honeywell Merger, 10 GEO. MASON L. REV. 489, 515 (2002) (“[E]mpirical analysis is precisely the big step that 
has been missing in translating post-Chicago analysis into a practical policy tool.”); David S. Evans & A. Jorge 
Padilla, Designing Antitrust Rules for Assessing Unilateral Practices: A Neo-Chicago Approach, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 
73, 80, 98 (2005) (criticizing Post-Chicago for its lack of reliance on data and expressing a need for empirical study 
of the cost of errors in enforcement); Kobayashi & Muris, supra note 4, at 148 (“[T]he lack of empirical verification 
 
key aspect of their methodology,110 others have acknowledged that “[p]ost-Chicago scholars 
readily admit” that “[m]ore theoretical and empirical economic work . . . needs to be done.”111 
Why has so little empirical validation of post-Chicago models been done? Sometimes 
post-Chicago models are based on the presumed order of decisions or other inherently 
unobservable characteristics that cannot easily be verified.112 Even when the facts can be 
 
. . . likely has limited the impact of Post-Chicago School economics on U.S. antitrust law”); id. at 159 (arguing that 
the emphasis on game theory has led “the Post-Chicago School [to] largely eschew[] generation of specific testable 
hypotheses and empirical testing of these models”); Bruce H. Kobayashi, Game Theory and Antitrust: A Post 
Mortem, 5 GEO. MASON L. REV. 411, 412 (1997) (“[G]ame theoretic models of IO have not been empirically 
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School’s Influence on Antitrust, COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L, Spring 2009, at 189, 189-90 (reviewing HOW THE 
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Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines: A Solution in Search of a Problem?, ANTITRUST, Fall 2007, at 74, 76 (“[Post-
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110 See Jonathan B. Baker, Competition Policy as a Political Bargain, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 483, 512 n.109 (2006) 
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motivated by structural models of imperfect competition “a growth area”); Michael S. Jacobs, The New 
Sophistication in Antitrust, 79 MINN. L. REV. 1, 38 (1994) (“Post-Chicago theory . . . contemplates rigorous 
empirical analysis . . . .”); Lawrence A. Sullivan, Post-Chicago Economics: Economists, Lawyers, Judges and 
Enforcement Officials in a Less Determinate Theoretical World, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 669, 670 (1995) (“Post-Chicago 
antitrust . . . digs into empirical material in an effort to fathom the significance of observed distinctions between 
classic models and the configuration of the particular market under examination.”). 
111 Reza Dibadj, Saving Antitrust, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 745, 811 n.306 (2004); accord Marina Lao, Reclaiming a 
Role for Intent Evidence in Monopolization Analysis, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 151, 179 (2004) (“[P]ost-Chicago economic 
analysis is far from determinate, and empirical work is insufficiently developed to answer critical questions bearing 
on antitrust liability.”). Many post-Chicago scholars have written specific statements to this effect. See, e.g., Stephen 
Calkins, Wrong Turns in Exclusive Dealing Law, in HOW THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE MARK, supra note 
1, 156, 167 (“There is a lot of speculating about the effects of exclusive dealing but not nearly enough empirical 
research.”); Carl Shapiro, Theories of Oligopoly Behavior, in 1 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 330, 409 
(Richard Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig eds., 1989) (using game theory to identify “quite a large number of 
strategic considerations that come into play” and determining that “[w]hat we are most in need of now are further 
tests of the empirical validity of these various theories of strategic behavior”); David T. Scheffman & Richard S. 
Higgins, Twenty Years of Raising Rivals’ Costs: History, Assessment, and Future, 12 GEO. MASON. L. REV. 371, 
380 (2003) (assessing the empirical support for raising rivals’ costs and concluding that “a fair assessment of the 
debate has been that . . . most of the cases [Krattenmaker and Salop] discuss . . . are not proved”). 
112 See Coate & Fischer, supra note 102, at 832 (noting that post-Chicago models are often “based on virtual facts 
that cannot be revealed in a court hearing . . . because the facts in question exist primarily as theoretical constructs to 
aid the modeling process”); accord id. at 797, 816 (hypothesizing that post-Chicago theories cannot find empirical 
support); Jacobs, supra note 7, at 254 (“[S]ome post-Chicago models depend on speculation about the reputational 
effects of apparently irrational strategic behavior . . . making empirical validation impossible.”). 
verified, the stylized nature of post-Chicago models further means that even when they are valid, 
they will apply only when the full set of restrictive criteria are met.113 
Absent empirical validation, post-Chicago models represent possibility theorems that tell 
us what can happen rather than “what must happen.”114 As was the case with respect to the 
Chicago School, these theorems are more useful for rebutting a conventional wisdom or for 
countering calls for categorical rules than they are in providing insight into how to strike the 
proper balance. It is striking that Robert Pitofsky criticized the Chicago School for relying more 
on theory than on facts.115 Absent empirical validation, the same can be said of post-Chicago.116 
C. Post-Chicago’s Impact on the Law 
The other key question is how influential the post-Chicago School has been on the law. 
Critics often claim that Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc.117 represents the 
only post-Chicago decision rendered by the Supreme Court.118 Moreover, Kodak has not proven 
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114 Franklin M. Fisher, Games Economists Play: A Noncooperative View, 20 RAND J. ECON. 113, 118 (1989). 
115 See Robert Pitofsky, Introduction: Setting the Stage, in HOW THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE MARK, 
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117 504 U.S. 451 (1992). 
118 See Crane, supra note 4, at 1922 (“[I]t is conventional wisdom that there has been one—and only one—‘post-
Chicago’ antitrust decision in the Supreme Court.”); Hylton & Salinger, supra note 108, at 481 (“Of the Supreme 
Court’s cases, only one, Eastman Kodak v. Image Technical Services, Inc., arguably falls into . . . the post-Chicago 
category.” (footnote omitted)); Fred S. McChesney, Talking ‘Bout My Antitrust Generation: Competition for and in 
the Field of Competition Law, 52 EMORY L.J. 1401, 1414 (2003) (“‘[P]ost-Chicago’ economic approaches to 
antitrust have had no important impact in the courts.”); Wright, supra note 19, at 249-50 (“While the Post-Chicago 
School has enjoyed meteoric success via several meaningful scholarly benchmarks, . . . it has had only modest 
impact in American courts, especially the Supreme Court.”). 
to be generative. The plaintiff abandoned its post-Chicago theory on remand,119 and “lower 
courts have bent over backwards to construe Kodak as narrowly as possible,”120 as even 
supporters have been forced to concede.121 
But signs of broader acceptance of post-Chicago thinking become more apparent once 
one looks beyond the Supreme Court. Herbert Hovenkamp has noted that notwithstanding 
Kodak’s limited influence, post-Chicago’s contributions to raising rivals’ costs and unilateral 
effects of horizontal mergers “are likely to endure,” although “they . . . pose a significant risk of 
being overused if their limitations are not kept in mind.”122 For example, the post-1984 Merger 
Guidelines exhibit a greater willingness to recognize that unilateral strategic behavior can have 
anticompetitive effects.123 In addition, lower court decisions have shown greater willingness to 
adopt post-Chicago precepts.124 
III. BEYOND POST-CHICAGO? 
This milestone conference provides the opportunity not just to recognize the place that 
the Chicago and the post-Chicago Schools have carved for themselves in the history of antitrust. 
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124 United States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 344 F.3d 229 (2d Cir. 2003); LePage’s, Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 
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It also provides the occasion to speculate on the prospects of nascent movements that may 
influence the directions that competition law will take in the future. 
A. The Emerging Debate Over Neo-Brandeisian/Hipster Antitrust 
A surprising aspect of the symposium was the lack of any extensive discussion of the 
growing call for a return to populist principles that is emerging in antitrust circles.125 Called neo-
Brandeisian antitrust by its supporters126 and hipster antitrust by skeptics,127 and popularized by 
Lina Khan128 and Barry Lynn,129 these advocates are calling for a return to a more structure-
oriented conception of competition policy that also accounts for the interests of other economic 
stakeholders as well as political considerations. This movement has garnered support from both 
ends of the political spectrum, being endorsed by multiple Democratic presidential candidates 
during the 2020 campaign130 as well as conservative pundits such as Steve Bannon.131 
 
125 For my initial reaction, see Christopher S. Yoo, Hipster Antitrust: New Bottles, Same Old W(h)ine?, ANTITRUST 
CHRON., Spring 2018, at 52. 
126 David Dayen, This Budding Movement Wants to Smash Monopolies, THE NATION (Apr. 4, 2017), 
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commercial giants like Amazon). 
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(2017) (testimony of Barry C. Lynn, Executive Director, Open Markets Institute),
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To date, the revival of populism has not gained much traction in mainstream antitrust 
circles. Noninterventionist antitrust scholars were predictably dubious.132 Enforcement-oriented 
scholars and advocates were similarly skeptical.133 Scholars attempting to position themselves 
between these two approaches also sounded notes of caution.134 
Any major shifts in antitrust law that may occur will not happen quickly. The hierarchical 
nature of the courts and the manner in which federal judges are appointed make antitrust doctrine 
slow to change. Major reform legislation also takes time and is likely to be hard to enact in the 
current political environment. Only time will tell what the ultimate impact of this movement will 
be. 
B. The Growing Emphasis on Empiricism 
The development that seems almost certain to have a major impact on antitrust law is the 
growing emphasis on empirical analysis. The change is perhaps most evident in the 2010 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines, which subordinated structural issues, such as market definition 
and market shares/concentration, that used to be the first considerations mentioned in previous 
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versions of the Guidelines and instead emphasized evidence of adverse competitive effects.135 
Indeed, the Guidelines explicitly state that “[t]he Agencies’ analysis need not start with market 
definition” when they can assess potential competitive harms using analytical tools that do not 
rely on market definition.136 The growing emphasis was also apparent in the decision rejecting 
the U.S. government’s attempt to block AT&T from acquiring Time Warner, which discounted a 
parameterized post-Chicago style bargaining model and instead credited an econometric 
regression analysis of prior instances of vertical integration in the market for multichannel 
television.137 
The move towards empiricism may be regarded as the logical next step in antitrust 
analysis. As the history of the structure-conduct-performance paradigm reveals, antitrust’s 
concern has always been on market performance and turned to structural inferences because 
direct data on market performance was generally unavailable. When direct evidence of 
performance became available, relying on it became preferable, particularly when there were 
multiple forces pushing in different directions and the net effect depends on which effects 
dominate. Indeed, this empiricism may be the more appropriate inheritor of the Harvard School 
tradition than the post-Chicago School. 
CONCLUSION 
In some ways, framing antitrust debates as a fundamental conflict between Chicago and 
New Harvard or post-Chicago seems somewhat overdrawn. All of these Schools concur in 
rejecting the pluralist approach advocated by the Populist School and embrace economic welfare 
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137 United States v. AT&T, Inc., 916 F.3d 1029, 1036-42, 1045-47 (D.C. Cir. 2019). 
as the exclusive focus of antitrust law. The key differences lie in the types of economic analysis 
favored by each School: price theory for Chicago, institutional considerations for New Harvard, 
and game theory for post-Chicago. To some extent, these variations reflect shifts in the current 
state of the art in economic scholarship. From a broader perspective, casting them as mutually 
exclusive options seems unduly restrictive, since all three approaches would seem to have 
important roles to play in analyzing competition and markets. 
Strikingly, both Chicago and post-Chicago admonish the other side for relying on 
abstract economic models that are largely conceptual and insufficiently empirical. In this regard, 
both critiques appear to have merit. Absent empirical validation, both sides are effectively 
reduced to offering possibility theorems that are well suited to debunking sweeping economic 
claims but offer less in terms of specific guidance on how to strike particular balances in real-
world markets. 
Questions about the goals of antitrust and the role of empiricism are emerging as 
important forces in the current debate over the future of antitrust law. To date, neo-Brandeisian 
attempts to revive the Populist School’s embrace of a pluralist vision of antitrust that takes more 
than just economic considerations into account has gained little traction. Only time will tell if 
that remains true in the future. At the same time, empiricism has become increasingly influential 
in antitrust analysis. It is possible that the emerging importance of empirical analysis may 
permanently shift focus away from structure, and even conduct, and towards more direct 
measures of market performance. Although neither trend was given much consideration during 
this symposium, I have little doubt that both will be given a thorough exploration at an event 
organized by this Law Review sometime in the future. 
